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Tummy Bee Calm

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Description

Tummy Bee CalmWinnaar van Beste Probioticum bij de Janey Loves PLATINUM Awards Met authentiek Mnuka honingpoeder uit Nieuw Zeeland MGO 300 Bevat calcium om bij te dragen aan de normale werking van de spijsverteringsenzymen Toegevoegde lactobacillus acidophilus Met kurkuma & gemberwortel Bevat: 30 Capsules Plantaardige capsuleomhulsel Beschrijving Een dagelijks voedingssupplement voor het behoud van een rustige en gezonde spijsvertering. Elke capsule bevat calcium,

Winnaar van Beste Probioticum bij de Janey Loves PLATINUM Awards

Met authentiek Mānuka honingpoeder uit Nieuw-Zeeland MGO 300

Bevat calcium om bij te dragen aan de normale werking van de spijsverteringsenzymen

Toegevoegde lactobacillus acidophilus

Met kurkuma & gemberwortel

Bevat: 30 Capsules

Plantaardige capsuleomhulsel

Beschrijving

Een dagelijks voedingssupplement voor het behoud van een rustige en gezonde spijsvertering. Elke capsule bevat calcium, kurkuma, vriesgedroogde Mānuka honing, lactobacillus, zwarte peper extract en gemberwortel extract.

De Mānuka honing is afkomstig uit onze eigen Manuka Doctor bijenkorven, gelegen in de weelderige groene bergen van Nieuw-Zeeland. De honing wordt vriesgedroogd tot poedervorm en toegevoegd aan onze formule, die liefdevol wordt geproduceerd in het Verenigd Koninkrijk volgens de hoogste standaarden. Het MGO (methylglyoxaal) niveau in Mānuka honing is afkomstig van DHA (dihydroxyacetone), dat van nature aanwezig is in de nectar van de Mānuka struik.

Waarom het werkt

Behoud een gezond spijsverteringssysteem met Manuka Plus Tummy Bee Calm. Zo dragen de belangrijkste ingrediënten bij aan je spijsvertering:

Mānuka honing (MGO 300)

Deze honing met hoge sterkte, gemaakt door bijen die nectar verzamelen van Nieuw-Zeelandse Mānuka struiken, bevat de actieve stof methylglyoxaal (MGO), die volgens een studie uit 2018 door Ulster University een antimicrobiële [1] en antibacteriële werking heeft op het lichaam. Onze Mānuka honing wordt geoogst uit de Manuka Doctor bijenkorven hoog in de Nieuw-Zeelandse bergen en vervolgens vriesgedroogd tot poeder.

Calcium

Dit mineraal is niet alleen goed voor botten en tanden. Het speelt ook een cruciale rol in je darmen, omdat het bijdraagt aan de normale werking van je spijsverteringsenzymen, volgens de Europese Commissie [3].

Spijsverteringsenzymen breken voedsel af, zoals eiwitten, vetten en koolhydraten, tot kleinere moleculen die je lichaam kan opnemen – en calcium is nodig om de afgifte van deze enzymen in je alvleesklier te activeren [4].

Een studie uit 2010 van de Universiteit van Massachusetts (VS) vond dat calcium de snelheid waarmee vetten worden omgezet in vetzuren verhoogde – meer calcium betekent een snellere spijsvertering [5].

Bronnen van calcium zijn onder andere zuivelproducten, donkergroene bladgroenten zoals boerenkool en broccoli, ingeblikte sardines en zalm, volle granen, en verrijkte plantaardige melk en ontbijtgranen [6].

Lactobacillus acidophilus

Manuka Plus Tummy Bee Calm bevat een soort vriendelijke bacteriën genaamd lactobacillus acidophilus die helpt bij de fermentatie van koolhydraten in voedsel, vooral lactose die in melk wordt aangetroffen [7].

De Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie definieert vriendelijke bacteriën, ook wel probiotica genoemd, als 'levende micro-organismen die bij toediening in adequate hoeveelheden een gezondheidsvoordeel voor de gastheer bieden' [8].

Veel studies hebben aangetoond dat vriendelijke bacteriën, zoals lactobacillus acidophilus, de natuurlijke balans van microflora in de darmen kunnen herstellen [9]. Volgens een studie uit 2011 van de Lund Universiteit (Zweden) kan dit helpen om darmontsteking te voorkomen of te verminderen [10].

Kurkuma

Deze specerij – gewonnen uit de plant Curcuma longa – wordt gebruikt in de traditionele Chinese en Ayurvedische geneeskunde voor verschillende doeleinden, waaronder de spijsvertering. Het actieve bestanddeel is curcumine, dat ontstekingsremmende en antioxidante eigenschappen heeft [11].

Kurkuma kan ook het aantal vriendelijke bacteriesoorten in je darmen verhogen, volgens een studie uit 2018 van de Universiteit van Californië – en dit kan je spijsverteringsgezondheid ondersteunen [12].

Gemberwortel extract

Een andere kruid is gemberwortel, die al honderden jaren wordt gebruikt om darmklachten zoals een opgeblazen gevoel, constipatie en misselijkheid te verlichten [13].

Het blijkt nu dat gember een effect heeft op je spijsvertering: een studie uit 2011 van de Chang Gung University College of Medicine (Taiwan) vond dat bij mensen met indigestie, gember de snelheid verhoogde waarmee de maag na een maaltijd leegloopt [14]. Veel studies hebben ook gemeld dat gember symptomen van misselijkheid kan verlichten bij reisziekte en voor zwangere vrouwen [15].

Bronnen
1. Alvarez-Suarez JM, et al. The Composition and Biological Activity of Honey: A Focus on Manuka Honey. Foods. 2014 Sep;3(3):420-432. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5302252/
2. Johnston M, et al. Antibacterial activity of Manuka honey and its components: An overview. AIMS Microbiology. 2018. 4(4):665-664. https://www.aimspress.com/fileOther/PDF/microbiology/microbiol-04-04-655.pdf
3. European Commission. EU Register on nutrition and health claims. http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/labelling_nutrition/claims/register/public/?event=search
4. Pandol SJ. Digestive Enzymes: Digestive Enzyme Synthesis and Transport. The Exocrine Pancreas. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK54127/
5. Hu M, et al. Role of calcium and calcium-binding agents on the lipase digestibility of emulsified lipids using an in vitro digestion model. Food Hydrocolloids. Vol 24, Issue 8, Nov-Dec 2010, 719-725. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268005X10000561#!
6. National Institutes of Health. Calcium: Fact Sheet for Consumers. https://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/Calcium-Consumer/
7. Medical News Today. Is Lactobacillus acidophilus good for health? https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/324194.php
8. Hill C, et al. Expert consensus document. The International Scientific Association for Probiotics and Prebiotics consensus statement on the scope and appropriate use of the term probiotic. Nat Rev Gastroenterol Hepatol. 2014 Aug;11(8):506-14. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24912386
9. Hemarajata P, Versalovic J. Effects of probiotics on gut microbiota: mechanisms of intestinal immunomodulation and neuromodulation. Therap Adv Gastroenterol. 2013 Jan;6(1):39-51. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3539293/
10. Hakansson A, Molin G. Gut Microbiota and Inflammation. Nutrients. 2011 Jun; 3 (6):637-682. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3257638/
11. Peterson CT, et al. Effects of Turmeric and Curcumin Dietary Supplementation on Human Gut Microbiota: A Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Pilot Study. J Evid Based Integr Med. 2018; 23. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6083746/
12. As above
13. Haniadka R, et al. A review of the gastroprotective effects of ginger (Zingiber officinale Roscoe). Food Funct. 2013 Jun;4(6):845-55. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23612703
14. Hu ML, et al. Effect of ginger on gastric motility and symptoms of functional dyspepsia. World J Gastroenterol. 2011 Jan 7;17(1):105-10. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21218090
15. Examine.com. Ginger. https://examine.com/supplements/ginger/

Onderscheidingen

Health & Wellbeing Awards 2019 - WINNAAR - Beste Probioticum

Deze awards vieren het allerbeste op het gebied van schoonheid, gezondheid, voeding en fitness, met een panel van deskundige juryleden, waaronder Nadia Sawalha van Loose Women en topvoedingsdeskundige Rick Hay.

Janey Loves Platinum Awards 2021 - WINNAAR - Beste Probioticum

De BBC Radio 2-presentator en bestsellerauteur Janey Lee Grace heeft de beste van de beste natuurlijke producten bekroond in de Janey Loves PLATINUM Awards 2021. Getest door een panel van juryleden en consumentenstemmen. De juryleden dit jaar zijn onder andere Janey Lee Grace, Jo Wood, Dr. Marilyn Glenville, Glynis Barber en Carrie Grant.

Gebruiksaanwijzing & Waarschuwingen

GEBRUIKSAANWIJZING: Neem één capsule per dag tijdens een maaltijd en overschrijd deze aanbevolen dagelijkse dosis niet. Dit product mag niet worden gebruikt als vervanging voor een gevarieerd, evenwichtig dieet en een gezonde levensstijl. Buiten het bereik van kinderen houden.

WAARSCHUWINGEN: Stop met gebruik en raadpleeg een arts als er bijwerkingen optreden. Vermijd dit product als je allergisch bent voor pollen, bijen of bijenproducten. Gebruik dit product niet zonder eerst een arts te raadplegen als je onder medische controle staat, voorgeschreven medicatie gebruikt, zwanger bent, borstvoeding geeft, astma of gerelateerde allergieën hebt.

OM TE OPENEN: Verwijder de doorzichtige plastic hoes via de perforatie aan de zijkant, en til het grotere bovenste gedeelte ervan af.

Ingredienten

Calciumcarbonaat, Kurkumapoeder, Plantaardig capsuleomhulsel (Hydroxypropyl Methylcellulose), Vriesgedroogd Manuka Honingpoeder (Maltodextrine), Anti-klontermiddelen (Magnesiumstearaat, Siliciumdioxide), Zwarte Peper Extract, Lactobacillus Acidophilus (Maltodextrine), Gemberwortel 20:1 Extract (Maltodextrine).

  • Geen toegevoegde smaakstoffen of kleurstoffen
  • Glutenvrij
  • Geen Soja & Noten
  • GMO-vrij
  • Geen toegevoegde zuivel of gist

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Debilea
Waukegan, US
★★★★★ 5
Attending to the inmost places of our heart
Format: Paperback
Sarah Clarkson’s newest book, “Reclaiming Quiet” is a masterful journey into the heart of what it means to be quiet before the Lord. I was hooked by the foreword and by the end of the first chapter, I was thinking of numerous friends I wanted to share this book with. We live in a noisy, attention-distracting world and it’s far too easy to get sucked into one activity after another without one thought of being still, of finding the rest and restoration that our mind, body and soul crave. Sarah’s writing draws the reader in with the loveliest of vignettes from her life as a Vicar’s wife, mother of 4 and author. Her writing is lyrically gorgeous-each story comes alive by her excellent word choice and vivid descriptions. She shares her struggles with OCD and really gets to the heart of what it means to find quiet in the midst of the busyness of each day. This is not a how-to or another step-by -step book, but more of a path that will guide the reader into thoughtful pondering of what it means to be still -to make time to sit quietly and commune with our Creator. A favorite quote from her book: “One of the great gifts that comes to us when we choose to step away from the chorus and listen to the Holy Spirit, is a capacity for conviction and courage. We need to attend in the inmost places of our hearts, where God speaks…We need to listen from the inside.” Reclaiming Quiet would make an excellent book club selection for a small group or to explore on your own-you won’t be disappointed. I can see this becoming a bestseller.
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Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2024
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Paul
Natrona Heights, US
★★★★★ 5
American Bullies at Bretton Woods
Format: Hardcover
There, I said it, and I am an American. I had heard of the conference but never read about it, and certainly had never heard of Harry Dexter White, but this book goes to great length to explain what happened in this important meeting as World War II was drawing to a close and a plan needed to be developed for a new world order regarding the flows of money to facilitate trade and avoid economic disruptions that the world had seen far too much of. Steil presents more information on John Maynard Keynes than his American antithesis, Harry Dexter White, and for good reason. Keynes was simply one of the most, if not the most, brilliant intellectuals of the 20th century. His theories of economics were evolving through his life, but he is most remembered for his idea that government stimulus could help alleviate a faltering economy when the private sector failed to do the job, and he was opposed as he said to the "gold cage" that for years had been the standard of international finance. He had a biting wit, coupled with a superior intelligence that far outshone his meager appearance (he was ugly, and knew it) but he was cast in the role of a diplomat to present the case for England as the world entered the post war period. The problem was that England was broke. She had endured two world wars in the space of 30 years and the empire was begging for funds from Washington, and most of her debt to the US from the Great War was still unpaid. She also had an enemy in FDR, who was determined that the imperial preference of England after the war was to be no more. Her crown jewel, India, was pressing for independence and the empire was in the process of unwinding, as was the strength of the British sterling. Keynes pressed to have the new institutions of the World Bank and the IMF located in London, and the Americans under the leadership of White simply said "hell no." Enter Harry Dexter White. The name is as deceptive as the individual. He was a son of Jewish immigrants, graduating from Harvard late in life, but brilliant in his intellect and determined that America would rule by the strenght of the dollar and Britain was to be no more as a world power. It was interesting to me to see the Treasury Department so powerful over this whole thing. You may think that the Department of State would have more of an influence because these were important global decisions, but their input was minimal. Regardless, White was a Soviet sympathizer and was just in the process of getting raked over the coals when he died early after the war from a heart attack. Keynes also died at the age of 62, not long after the war. The world remember Keynes and White is more of a footnote. I personally did not like White. He reminded me of a Himmler with his rim glasses and nasty litte mustache. As for his boss, Henry Morganthau, Secretary of Treasury, he was little better. His idiotic plan to strip Germany of all industrial capability after the war and turn it into a nation of small farms was leaked to the press and Goebbels made hay of it, likely resulting in many more American casualities toward the end of the war. Just goes to show that FDR used some strange people in his administration. Thank God his selection of generals was far better. America was brutal toward the British at Bretton Woods. We often think of the English speaking peoples uniting and working together in true harmony to defeat the fascist nations. That is a myth and this book helps bust it. It shows to me how inhuman America was to our British allies, who bore much of the battle of this war alone, with little hope of survival. It is said that when Winston Churchill learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he knew that England would win the war and when he retired, he slept like a baby. Little did he know that the selfishness of the U.S. government would put a boot on the neck of England after the war. Churchill once said that the Germans were either at your throat or under your foot. The later part of that pertains to the American response to England toward the end of the war and after. A good book. Great information, and highly recommended.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 9, 2013
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Andrew A.
Louisville, US
★★★★★ 4
Easy read on Difficult subject
Format: Kindle
This well-documented book explodes the myth of Bretton Woods. The battle between Harry White and John Maynard Keynes turns out to have been contrived.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 30, 2026
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Eric G
Cuba, US
★★★★★ 5
A great book for anyone interested in US foreign policy, history, or economics
Format: Hardcover
In July of 1944 representatives from forty-four nations gathered at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, NH to establish the rules for the post World War II international monetary system. Although nations from around the globe were at the table, the primary debate was between the United States and Great Britain. The U.S. was determined to advance a policy ensuring the dollar reigned supreme in world trade, thus guaranteeing American dominance. The British were holding out for a monetary system that would not relegate them to a secondary status after the war. Representing the two great nations were two men. For the U.S. it was a little-known economist working as an assistant to the Secretary of Treasury, Harry Dexter White, and representing the British was world-known economist John Maynard Keynes. Benn Steil examines the Bretton Woods conference, and the inter-war years leading up to it, using these two men as a backdrop. Not only is the work well researched, but as a senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, Steil is eminently qualified to make economic judgements. Steil’s thoroughness and expertise combine to make an enjoyable read of what could otherwise be an exceptionally dry topic. The main argument Steil makes is that the dominance of dollar in the post WWII economy was a fait accompli at Bretton Woods. Mr. Steil introduces the reader to the relatively unknown Harry Dexter White, a minor player at the U.S. Treasury commanding great influence. Steil shows the reader that going into Bretton Woods, White and his boss, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, were committed to bringing President Roosevelt’s New Deal to the rest of the world. Part of this plan was to shift power not only from London, but from Wall Street as well, to the U.S. Treasury. White was convinced international banking had played a key role in creating the instability responsible for WWII. A new gold standard tied to the U.S. dollar would ensure stability in White’s view. Ultimately White’s ideas led to the creation of “the three so-called Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank” (Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods, 127). Adding intrigue to economics Steil also shows through declassified F.B.I. documents and recently discovered writings by White, that White was an agent of the Soviet Union. Keynes is often regarded as “the first-ever international celebrity economist” (Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods, 3). While this may be true, he was no match for the little-known White. White (and Morgenthau) considered the British a threat on the economic stage and made sure their Lend-Lease terms would bankrupt the U.K. by the end of the war and bring them to the bargaining table. As well as being an interesting historical read, and a useful primer on international monetary policy, Steil captures the importance of economic policy in relation to foreign policy. Morgenthau and White realized the power of the U.S. to inflict its will upon other nations was rooted in the power of the dollar. Today as then, U.S. power flows from the economy. Students of modern U.S. foreign policy would be wise to have a basic understanding of U.S. economic policy and how the U.S. economy interacts in the global system.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 2, 2020
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Etienne RP
New York, US
★★★★★ 5
Hosting Diplomatic Conferences 101: The Case of Bretton Woods
Format: Paperback
Bretton Woods was the most important international gathering since the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I read this book looking for clues on how to host international conferences: how to accommodate delegates, maintain protocol, overcome obstacles, build consensus, and reach a satisfying outcome. I was disappointed on that count. The Battle of Bretton Woods doesn’t focus on the Bretton Woods conference per se. It is a work of intellectual history built around the two characters of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. It describes the way these two Treasury officials negotiated the main financial issues facing the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II and immediately after: the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 granting the British access to war finance and equipment; the blueprints for a postwar monetary order that began circulating in 1942 and ultimately culminated in the adoption of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at Bretton Woods; the signing of the $4.4 billion Anglo-American Financial Agreement in December 1945; and the inaugural meeting of the IMF board of governors in Savannah, Georgia, on March 8, 1946. It mixes these elements of diplomatic history with personal aspects of the lives of the two main characters: Keynes’s inflated ego and lack of diplomatic acumen that resulted in missed opportunities for Great Britain; and White’s dual personality as the braintrust of the US Treasury and as a mole operating clandestinely for the Soviets. To be sure, there are some useful indications on the Bretton Woods conference itself. It took place in the Mount Washington Hotel in New Hampshire, a luxury resort with striking views of the White Mountains. The organization itself was a mess: “everything is in a state of glorious confusion,” commented British economist Lionel Robbins, who added: “with all their virtues as technicians—and these are very great—the Americans are not good organizers of international conferences.” The conference took place in war time, and army bus and personnel brought the delegates in and out. Delegates were thrown out of the hotel on July 23 for fear they would reopen the discussion and have a closer look at the hastily agreed texts. The location itself owed a lot to domestic politics. US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau wanted to court a local politician for future support of the agreement in the Senate, remembering the disastrous defeat of Wilson’s League of Nations in Congress after World War I. The press was also in attendance, and Bretton Woods became one of the first international conferences to be covered live by the media. Most of the delegates came from Ministries of Finance or central banks, and true diplomats—the ones hailing from Ministries of Foreign Affairs—were a rare occurrence. The US Treasury Department had willingly kept the State Department out of the loop, and considered the only senior diplomat present, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, as “one of them”. The conference was only the tip of the iceberg: everything was set in advance, during the two years when plans were circulated and drafts were discussed. The invitations were sent to forty-four nations, but the United States ran the show from start to finish, and even British delegates were relegated to a secondary role. Keynes, who had termed the Reconstruction Bank scheme imagined by White “the work of a lunatic,…some sort of bad joke,” was named chairman of the commission that drafted the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, while White himself dealt with the much more significant IMF. As for other nations, their input was limited to discussing the national quotas that would measure their relative power and influence at the boards of the two institutions or, in the case of the Cubans, to “providing the cigars”. White’s goal was to “channel the energy, aims, ambitions, and vanities of the mass of delegates into meaningless debate.” As an American organizer wily remarked, “there should be just one general rule: that anybody can talk as long as he pleases, provided he doesn’t say anything.” To make things even safer, the session secretaries were all Americans, appointed by White, and it was they who wrote the official minutes of the committees. Some important remarks made during sessions disappeared from the draft minutes, while crucial provisions were introduced surreptitiously in the final text versions. As an example, White’s technicians strategically replaced “gold” with “gold and dollars” in the paper describing the foundations of the postwar monetary order, a crucial modification that Keynes discovered only after his departure from Bretton Woods. The result was, in Keynes’s words, “the most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years.” The distinguished Cambridge don liked that expression, and indeed often referred to non-Anglo-saxons as monkeys, with a special mention to the French which he utterly despised. But the monkey-king in this diplomatic jungle was certainly Keynes himself. Long before Paul Krugman and Thomas Piketty, Keynes was the first-ever international celebrity economist. He was surrounded by an aura of awe and admiration, and the printed media craved for his every declarations. In Benn Steil’s rendering, he had “an effortless facility with words that might have made him a master diplomat, had he actually been more concerned with convincing opponents than with cornering them logically and humiliating them.” “The man is a menace for international relations,” remarked fellow British economist James Meade, who nonetheless revered him. He would make aggressive jokes on lawyers in front of American lawyers, show his contempt for other delegates by displaying his immense intellectual superiority, and try to steal the show by pretending the outcomes of negotiations were all due to his influence while in fact they ran counter to his prescriptions. His last speech in Savannah, where he metaphorically summoned spirits and fairies to bestow the newborn institutions with their gifts, was taken as a personal attack by the American delegate: “I do mind being called a fairy,” he muttered to his aide. If a statesman is to be judged by his capacity to serve the national interest, Keynes failed miserably in his attempt at statesmanship. This is not to say that he didn’t have Britain’s interest in mind. His visionary monetary schemes notwithstanding, he had ultimately come to the United States with the mission of conserving what he could of bankrupt Britain’s historic imperial prerogatives. As Schumpeter wrote, “Keynes’s advice was in the first instance always English advice, born of English problems.” Keynes was thoroughly British, and it was the British problems of his day that drove his theorizing: problems of deflation and depression, paying for war and surviving the perilous transition to peace. He had spent his career thinking about monetary issues as a way to preserve his country’s clout in the world. In particular, the shift of financial power from London to New York was a matter of constant concern for him. But he lacked the basic insight that the Americans did not share British national interests, and that they could even be rival powers on the international scene. Throughout the war, Keynes continuously overestimated American sympathies with Britain and underestimated the importance of public and congressional resistance to US aid or involvement. He thought of Bretton Woods as a battle of ideas, counting on his immense intellectual superiority to carry the day, whereas it was first and foremost a battle of power and influence, with the United States as the clear winner. Indeed, British and American interests were not identical, however much both peoples were dedicated to destroying Nazism. Henry White had a clear goal in Bretton Woods: to entrench the dollar as the world’s currency, and to make it “as good as gold”. He used the leverage provided by the Lend-Lease agreement and Britain’s quasi-bankrupt situation in order to put a permanent end to the pound sterling’s international role. This required dismantling the structural supports of the British empire. In particular, Americans sought to put an end to “imperial preference”, by which Britain secured privileged trade access to the markets of its colonies and dominions. There was no room in the new order for the remnants of British imperial glory: the postwar world needed to be grounded in nondiscriminatory multilateral trade and full monetary convertibility. The Americans never deviated from their hard-line geopolitical terms. Many held no particular sympathy for the British, who had “shamefully walked away from their Great War debt obligations,” and who were trying to extend their Empire’s lease of life by credit. At Bretton Woods, we see American power in full swing, and in particular the role of the US Treasury as the economic arm of American foreign policy. Contrary to the myth, Bretton Woods did not provide the economic foundation for postwar prosperity and monetary stability. And it was not the cooperative, disinterested, forward-looking endeavor that people often have in mind when they stress the need for a new Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods system didn’t work the way it was supposed to. It was effective for only a brief period, and then not for the reason its authors had envisaged. It was not until 1961, fifteen years after the IMF was inaugurated, that the first nine European countries formally adopted the required provisions that their currencies be convertible into dollars. Even then, Bretton Woods was an ineffective and crisis-prone monetary system. It began experiencing potentially fatal difficulties as early as the late 1950s, and was only kept alive by a series of political fixes that made little long-term, macroeconomic sense. It could never have survived the globalization of finance and the removal of capital controls that began to take place in the 1970s. Indeed, it can be argued that the system was doomed the moment that it came into existence, and that the Bretton Woods agreements contained fatal flaws that could only lead to the abandon of gold convertibility. Not only was Bretton Woods a crisis-prone, unstable system: it was also a bad deal for Great Britain and, one could argue, for the United States and for the world as well. What Britain actually needed in 1944-45 was short-term financing at reasonable cost with few geopolitical strings attached, and possibly a lower exchange rate. There was evident hubris in the attempt to design a global monetary system, to be managed by an international body, at a time when the outcome of the war was not yet clear. Keynes and White’s ambition was to create “a New Deal for a new world,” but they lacked the political legitimacy and also the effective means to achieve such a grand plan. Another course of action was possible for the United Kingdom, one suggested by a British Treasury official after the facts: postpone the “Grand Design” negotiations, avoid irreversible decisions, try to buy time until you see how the new postwar world develops, and borrow your way out of the crisis by getting a commercial loan from Wall Street. Who at Bretton Woods would have thought that the British empire would unravel, the United States and the Soviet Union turn into arch-enemies, and the world divide into hostile camps just two years after the conference? There was no necessity to conclude Bretton Woods in a haste. Waiting for the San Francisco conference to address the issue of money and finance jointly with the creation of the United Nations would have made the postwar institutional framework more coherent. The world would have avoided the dichotomy between the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington and the United Nations in New York, in which both seem to live on completely different planes. So are there practical lessons from Bretton Woods for statesmen and diplomats hosting international meetings, such as the Paris Conference on Climate Change that will take place in end-November and December 2015? First, as the previous attempt to tackle climate change at Copenhagen taught us, the summit itself is not the place where comprehensive negotiations should take place. Most items on the agenda should be solved beforehand, in preparatory meetings among experts or in a pre-summit rehearsal such as the UN General Assembly in New York. Second, organizers should make sure they keep a bone for the leaders and national delegates to chew, one that is easy enough to grasp and with a clear payoff in terms of national interest, such as the quota issue at Bretton Woods. Managing expectations and egos will always be a tricky issue, but one that diplomats are best equipped to handle. How to deal with the media is also a key issue, particularly in our age of instant communication and world broadcasting. Lastly, a modicum of modesty should be in order: the world is not going to be saved by international conferences, however successful they turn out to be. For Britain in 1944 and for the planet as a whole in 2015, buying time is always a sensible option.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 10, 2015

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